Challenge is Not Accepted: When Belief Superiority Responds to Uncertainty and Promotes Religious Intolerance by Wulandari, Roosalina
Challenge is Not Accepted:  
When Belief Superiority Responds to Uncertainty and 
Promotes Religious Intolerance 
 
Roosalina Wulandari1, Bagus Takwin2  
1Faculty of Psychology, Universitas Indonesia and International Business Management 
Program, Management Department,  
BINUS Business School Undergraduate Program, Bina Nusantara University  
2Faculty of Psychology, Universitas Indonesia 
 
 
Abstract 
The rising intolerance in Indonesia is spiking and has become more confounding due to 
the heated political temperature following series of government election. Religious 
identity is politicized in a magnitude that escalates religious fundamentalism and 
consequently, intolerance. Past research shown how personal uncertainty enable 
individuals to find closure through firm beliefs and ideologies. This article is aimed to 
explore how the need for closure construct belief superiority as a coping mechanism 
towards perceived threats of challenged worldviews, and how it potentially strengthened 
intolerance when supported collectively. In effort to be able to tailor an understanding, 
this article will review the perspectives of uncertainty-identity and the need for closure, 
the development of belief superiority, and how Terror Management Theory sees 
individuals with challenged worldview. An integrative perspective of how belief 
superiority manifests as a response to the need for closure inflicted by personal 
uncertainties is offered, and ends with a discussion on how belief superiority affecting 
religious intolerance as a retaliation to cope when worldview is threatened. 
 
 
 
“But it is the same with man as with the tree. The more he seeks to rise into the height and light, 
the more vigorously do his roots struggle earth word, down word, into the dark, the deep - into 
evil.” 
(Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia is currently exposed to a challenging virtue of rising intolerance. Scholars and 
observers of Indonesian politics agree that Indonesian Islam and society is moving 
progressively towards conservative direction (Hamayotsu, 2013). Despite the fact that the 
1998 riot and the fall of the New Order regime opened doors to democracy (McCoy, 
2013), the changing political nuance accommodates social vigilantism that promotes 
intolerance and discriminative behaviors (Menchik, 2014). This leads the situation to a 
heating religious group interactions between the Muslim majority groups and the other 
groups which creates concerns over the threat towards liberalism and religious pluralism 
(McCoy, 2013). The recent democratic exercises in Indonesia, began with the 2017 
Jakarta’s gubernatorial election and escalated throughout the 2019 Presidential’s 
election, suffers from the rising intolerance ambience. Findings from a nation-wide survey 
conducted by CSIS (2017) revealed alarming results on level of intolerance towards 
differences of ideas, values and beliefs. The result displays resistance towards leadership 
of different religion that the Muslim majority. Echoing to the result is the survey 
conducted by PPIM-UIN [2017] also reflecting on factors contributing to the rising 
intolerance, such as perceived threats towards the Muslim majority. The phenomenon of 
intolerance is also amplified by the growing spirit of religious purification movements 
which accommodates factors of exclusions and eschewing any forms of innovation and 
engagement with cultural context. 
 
The phenomenon of intolerance in Indonesia is explained by Menchik (2014) as a result 
of Godly Nationalism. A term that defines an imagined community united by common, 
orthodox theism, and collaboratively mobilized by the state with the support of existing 
religious organizations. While Godly Nationalism demands citizens’ faith of God, no 
specific religion is enforced. Hence, Indonesia’s develop a national identity of being 
exclusively religious but not particular. For this national identity to sustain, some beliefs 
must be privileged and any forms of deviations is not tolerated as it is perceived as threats 
to the preferred worldview, particularly religion.  
 
Previous research concurred factors that lie foundations for religious intolerance. Studies 
conferred that personal uncertainties leads to the need for closure [Brandt & Reyna, 
2010; Jost, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, 
& De Grada, 2006]. Personal uncertainties derived from individual worldviews comprised 
of many things such as values, attitudes, the future, beliefs, religions, and many more. 
Since people usually believe that their worldviews are the superior and righteous ones 
[Hogg, Kruglanski & Bos, 2013; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Stephan, Stephan, & Gudykunst, 
1999], people don’t respond well to being countered by others [Jacks & Cameron, 2003; 
Brandt, 2017; Saucier & Webster, 2010]. Hence, when the worldview is challenged, 
people perceive it as threats to their self and identity [Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Stephan, 
Stephan, & Gudykunst, 1999].  
 
Table 1. Comparative studies on religious intolerance 
 
 
Literatures 
on 
Reasons for 
Intolerance 
 
Brandt & 
Reyna, 2010; 
Jost, 2006; 
Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, 
& Sulloway, 
2003; 
Kruglanski, 
Pierro, 
Mannetti, & 
De Grada, 
2006 
 
 
Jacks & 
Cameron, 
2003; 
Brandt, 
2017; 
Saucier & 
Webster, 
2010 
 
Stephan & 
Stephan, 
1985; 
Stephan, 
Stephan, & 
Gudykunst, 
1999 
 
Hogg, 
Kruglanski & 
Bos, 2013; 
Stephan & 
Stephan, 
1985; 
Stephan, 
Stephan, & 
Gudykunst, 
1999 
 
 
Goldman & Hogg, 
2013; Hogg & 
Smith, 2007; 
Terry & Hogg, 
1996; Karpov, 
Lisovskaya, & 
Barry, 2012 
 
Walker & 
Pettigrew, 1984; 
Walker & Smith, 
2002; Hogg & 
Adelman, 2013 
 
 
Research 
topics 
 
 
Personal 
uncertainty 
 
 
Dislike 
worldviews 
 
 
 
 
 
Believe that 
beliefs is better 
than others when 
 
 
Collective 
identification 
and the 
need for 
closure 
that are 
different 
and/or 
challenging 
Perceived 
[symbolic] 
threats 
Believe that 
belief is better 
than others 
 
strengthen 
collectively, 
ingroup 
identification, 
group identity 
salience and 
entitavity 
 
reduce personal 
uncertainty/ 
anxiety 
 
Proposed 
Synthesis 
 
 
When personal uncertainty manifests the need for closure in belief superiority, collective identity 
salience is needed to sustain closure and offers support to retaliate when worldview is challenged and 
threat is perceived. 
 
 
 
In effort to maintain the closure gained from their worldview, people need assurance 
from similar-minded people to ensure the firmness of the preferred belief and its 
sustainability. Collective accordance by groups with salient identity offers that assurance 
[Goldman & Hogg, 2016; Hogg & Smith, 2007; Terry & Hogg, 1996; Karpov, Lisovskaya, & 
Barry, 2012]. The collectively-shared belief then offers reduction of anxiety caused by 
personal uncertainty and provide closure [Walker & Pettigrew, 1984; Walker & Smith, 
2002; Hogg & Adelman, 2013]. Belief superiority then become a manifestation for the 
need of closure. Particularly from religious point of view, the superiority develop not only 
from the content of the religious teachings itself, but mostly from the way belief is 
interpreted (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017). Those who interpret religious teachings 
literally are more prone to fundamentalism/closed-mindedness and perceived any 
different worldviews as threats, than those who employ symbolic approach towards the 
principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Exploratory path of religious intolerance 
 
 
As previous studies have mapped out factors that are contributing to traits, behaviors and 
predictors that explains the dynamics of religious intolerance, this paper will try to tailor 
an integrative, and potentially sequential dynamics, that transforms personal uncertainty 
to develop belief superiority and translated in religious intolerance behavior. This paper 
will try to walk through previous studies in relevance to intergroup relations and religious 
intolerance by also putting highlights on relevant constructs promoting intolerance, such 
us uncertainties, prejudice, perceived threats, and preconceived fundamentalism to begin 
exploring the details of intergroup relations and followed by how social identity being put 
into contexts of intergroup relations and the attitudes developed towards dissimilar 
others. An integrative perspective of how belief superiority manifests as a response to the 
need for closure inflicted by personal uncertainties is offered, and ends with a discussion 
on how individuals can manage uncertainties by grasping the concept of belief superiority 
as a way to cope when worldview is threatened. 
 
 
RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE 
Researches on intergroup contact mostly based their stemmed ideas in Allport’s text of 
The Nature of Prejudice, which elaborated contact as a means of reducing prejudice. The 
original contact hypothesis introduced four contact conditions crucial to reduce 
prejudice, such as equal status of the groups in the situation, intergroup cooperation, 
common goals, and authority support. As Pettigrew and Tropp [2006] concurred that a 
meta-analysis study indicates that the four conditions facilitate and improved outgroup 
attitudes, but not necessarily essential to reduce prejudice. 
 
Recent development recognized five different facets that have characterized much of 
intergroup contact research over the past 20 years [Dovidio, Love, Schellhaas, & 
Hewstone, 2017]. Those facets are forms of contact, mediating mechanisms, moderating 
factors, nature and temporal stage of the intergroup exchange, and outcomes of contact. 
Contemporary research in forms of contact specify types of contact into direct [extended 
and vicarious] and indirect [imagined and virtual] contact. As stated by Pettigrew and 
Tropp [2006] and Brown and Hewstone [2005], intergroup contact helps increase 
empathy with the outgroup and reduce anxiety 
 
According to Integrated Threat Theory [ITT] perspective, intergroup anxiety are displayed 
as high when people rely on their response on cognitive heuristics, namely stereotypes, 
and in return expressing typically negative emotions and evaluations, such as prejudice 
[Stephan, Stephan, & Gudykunst, 1999]. Since ITT focuses on prejudice, its ability to 
predict intergroup attitude is highlighting mostly on the detrimental effects of intergroup 
relations as induced by anxiety. As anxiety is claimed to be one of the major threats that 
leads to anxiety, ITT also incorporates uncertainty as a related construct that heightened 
prejudice. 
 
Another perspective that is also focusing immensely on uncertainty would be coming 
from Uncertainty-Identity Theory [Hogg, 2007]. The key premise stated that since 
uncertainty creates difficulties to anticipate and plan, it empowers motives and behavior 
to reduce it [Hogg, 2000, 2007a, 2012]. In the light of promoting intolerance, Hogg and 
Adelman [2013] argued that self-uncertainty promotes individuals to incline with extreme 
groups. This could be the risk factors following predictions of the Uncertainty-Identity 
Theory that identified how people, in effort to reduce anxiety, have the tendency to be 
self-inclusively categorizing themselves into groups when faced with uncertainties, and 
would prefer groups that display clear, simple, unambiguous, consensual, and focused – 
which is prototypically relevant with groups holding extreme ideologies. The logic of 
relationship between uncertainty and group entitativity was found across studies 
explaining radicalism and zealotry (Hogg, 2005, 2007; Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 
2010; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006).  
 
 
UNCERTAINTY AND THE NEED FOR CLOSURE 
Previous research connects uncertainty and defensive behavior (Niedbala & Hohman, 
2018). The principle tenet of Uncertainty-Identity Theory (Hogg, 2007) claims that 
uncertainty creates abhorrent feelings for not being able to anticipate situations and 
actions. Thus, uncertainty provokes behavior that can manage anxiety and reduce 
uncertainty. When faced with uncertainty and in need to protect oneself, grounding one’s 
beliefs and worldviews with like-minded people helps reduce anxiety and at the same 
time reinforce their worldviews collectively (Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Ham, 
2005). Since worldviews offer the sense of predictability, certainty, and self-worth, people 
will take actions to protect it from challenges and other perceived threats (Goplen & 
Plant, 2015).  
 
In effort to protect and preserve their beliefs, people can also selectively avoid and isolate 
themselves from views that are dissent than theirs and negate strongly towards those 
who think differently. Uncertainty can also be managed effectively by group identification 
as a result of self-categorization (Hogg & Adelman, 2013). This motivation to protect and 
promote the ideological integrity derived from the feeling of moral superiority and in the 
hardships of uncertainty, people display need of closure by indicating close-mindedness 
and intolerance [Hogg, Kruglanski, & Bos, 2013]. Failure to accomplish the sense of being 
righteous and superior will result in greater anxiety due to the unfulfilled need for closure. 
 
 
UNCERTAINTY AND RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM 
Looking into how the development takes place, the rise of fundamentalism was a 
response to uncertainties presented by globalization and modernization, followed by 
changes and some contexts of economic, social, and political stability. Religious 
fundamentalism, in particular, surged as more dogmatic and intolerant towards 
inconsistency and ambiguity in response to their increased need for closure (Brandt & 
Reyna, 2010). When the need for closure is high in the presence of uncertainty, extreme 
groups and ideologies might offer the means of reducing anxiety. Extreme groups and 
ideologies, typically reflected in religious and political fundamentalism, displays 
intolerance in forms of a rejection of scientific advancement (Scheufele, Corley, Shih, 
Dalrymple, & Ho, 2009), prejudice toward a variety of outgroups (Hunsberger& Jackson, 
2005), and violence [Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009]. As further elaborated by 
Brandt and Reyna [2010], fundamentalism offers closure as it protects people from 
dissent values, provide orders and predictability.  
 
This is echoed by other studies summaries that stated how fundamentalism works as an 
adaptive process to offer coherency, sense of control, and the reduction of ambiguity 
(Brandt & Reyna, 2010). Other studies emphasized that in effort to obtain firm 
knowledge, fundamentalists look for an epistemic authority or leaders figure with 
expertise and credentials to provide unfalsifiable truth (Kruglanski et al., 2005). The need 
for this firm knowledge derive from the needs to manage uncertainty due to the nature 
of ideologies that promote stability and conservatism (Jost, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; 
Jost Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai, & Ostafin, 2007; Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999). 
 
Rejecting those perceived upholding different values from theirs helps fundamentalists 
to avoid attacks and challenges on their beliefs and worldviews (e.g., Hunsberger & 
Jackson, 2005; Jackson & Esses, 1997; Mavor & Gallois, 2008), and at the same time, 
invalidate opposing beliefs and worldviews. The prejudice and discrimination aimed at 
outgroup members are considered as efforts to bolster one’s cultural worldview (Das, 
Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Greenberg et al., 1990; Kruglanski & 
Webster,1991; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2000) and also to reserve cognitive 
closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991).  
 
 
 
 
TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY 
As stated by Terror Management Theory (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991; 
Greenberg, Koole, & Pyszczynski, 2004), individual’s existential and personal significance 
is ultimately threatened by mortality salience. This awareness of mortality creates anxiety 
(Maxfield, John, & Pyszczynski, 2014) that motivates significance restoration. Reminded 
to personal mortality salience potentially strengthen the favored belief systems (Bassett, 
Van Tongeren, Green, Sonntag, & Kilpatrick, 2015). However, a study conducted by Van 
den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, and Van den Ham (2005) claimed that personal 
uncertainty played a greater role to moderate defense reactions of the challenged 
worldview, than mortality salience (Van den Bos, van Ameijde, and Van Gorp, 2006). 
 
In order to manage the threat of personal insignificance, individuals seek attachment to 
social groups to be able to share their own worldview and render service to the group in 
effort to restore their self-esteem. As individual seeks to manage the anxiety of 
insignificance and uncertainties, unfalsifiable confirmation in the context of ideologies 
become a rewarding result for the existential quest (Friesen, Campbell & Kay, 2015) and 
creates susceptibility toward extreme ideas and groups (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 
2010; Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007).  Susceptibility to extreme 
ideas and groups open passages for religious zeal to develop. Because zeal is powerful, it 
continuously engages commitment to idealistic extremes that are interpreted as the 
morally superior by the believers and as antisocial by others. Religious zeal is strengthen 
by ideas of conviction for one’s belief superiority and derogation of others (McGregor, 
Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008). As conclude by McGregor, Haji, and Kang (2008), people 
search for unfalsifiable notions (such as religions) because having clarity about positive 
self-worth and being part of a group, offers a sense of belief accuracy and gives answer 
to the existential questions that is constantly challenged by mortality salience. 
 
 
BELIEF SUPERIORITY 
When an unfalsifiable ideology is overly self-evaluated and perceived as positive, 
individuals and groups begin to develop belief superiority (Tappin & McKay, 2016), which 
refers to a conviction that one’s own or group’s beliefs or attitudes are better or more 
righteous than others’ (Toner, Leary, Asher & Jongman-Sereno, 2013; Brandt, Evans, & 
Crawford, 2015; Hall & Raimi, 2018) and they are more likely to be moral compared to 
others (Klein & Epley, 2017). An assumption of religious superiority occurs when groups 
exclusivity involves beliefs that they are spiritually, religiously, and morally distinguish 
compared to others (Karpov, Lisovskaya & Barry, 2012), and eventually, displaying 
intolerance towards different ideas, values and groups. 
 
Belief superiority was initially introduced by Saucier and Webster (2010) as part of the 
explanation on social vigilantism. According to Saucier and Webster [2010], belief 
superiority is a form of social vigilantism where individual feels the tendency to assert 
their ‘superior’ beliefs to correct others, for the ‘greater good’, whose opinion is 
considered as more ignorant. However, O’Dea, Bueno, and Saucier, 2018) later argued 
that social vigilantism also displays respect for others who stand by strongly to their 
favored beliefs. In the development, belief superiority established notions that shares 
similarity to several other related constructs such as moral superiority, self-righteousness, 
religious zeal, and ingroup glorification. 
 
The comparative constructs was presented to give an idea of how the other related 
constructs shared similar characteristics with belief superiority. Self-righteousness serves 
the definition of one’s conviction that the cherished beliefs and action are correct 
compared to the alternatives possessed by others (Falbo & Shepperd, 1986). The concept 
of moral superiority (Tappin & McKay, 2016) was defined as a perceived collective identity 
that is based on illusion-like, overly-positive self-evaluation and not open to critiques. 
Ingroup glorification sets a similar tone on how superiority is evaluated collectively by 
group members (Leidner, Castano, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), where superiority beliefs and 
ingroup impeccability tolerates ingroup wrong doings, such as oppression and/or forms 
of violence. The term zeal, was elaborated by McGregor, Galliot, Vasquez, and Nash 
(2007) as a conviction and determination of idealism that demands consensus and leave 
no rooms for dissents.  
 
 
 
SYNTHESIS 
Throughout the past two decades, more studies and theories of tolerance is still in need 
to be largely developed [Simon, Eschert, Schaefer, Reininger, Zitzmann, & Smith, 2018]. 
Societal uncertainties also remains an issue that has continuously fortified extremes 
movements [Fiske, 2013] and social justice seems to offer restrain to uncertainties and 
extremism as it tries to accommodate equality, respect and ability to voice out. Violations 
to social justice combined with perceived threats to groups will lead to uncertainties and 
resulting in negative set of beliefs towards the outgroups [Doosje, Loseman, & van den 
Bos, 2013]. Leaning towards extremes is rewarding because extreme groups provide 
clarity of structure, identities, and well-planned action that helps reduce uncertainties 
[Fiske, 2013]. 
 
The notion is echoed by Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, and Van den Ham 
(2005) stated that in effort to protect beliefs and worldviews from perceived threats, 
people need to come into exposure to consenting people repeatedly in order to reduce 
uncertainty. Selective exposure is another path that can be taken to deflect form different 
worldviews. Upon encounter or challenged, derogating other’s preferred beliefs and 
worldviews emerges as a common probable response. People need to feel that their 
favored views are more correct and superior than others, and sharing the views 
collectively protects and encourages the belief’s superiority. 
 
Referring to the exploratory path displayed in Figure 1, it is worth looking into the 
integrative explanation from the uncertainty and need for closure perspective, how belief 
superiority when strengthen with group identity salience, despite the type and frequency 
of contact, could manifests in religious intolerance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Hypothetical model on religious intolerance 
 
 
 
 
The great majority of intergroup contact studies have focused on the effects upon the 
majority or more powerful, non-stigmatized group in the interaction. A series of intriguing 
contact studies pointed out the importance of including subjective factors of both 
minority and majority group members in the interaction as an imperative perspective to 
intergroup contact theory (Shelton & Richeson, 2006; Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 
2005; Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Trawalter, 2005). Existing previous studies seem to 
leave room for exploration as highlighted by Pettigrew [2008]. Some findings interestingly 
contradict previous knowledge of how intergroup contact reduce prejudice by saying that 
contact that offers knowledge about the outgroup may be of minor importance in 
contrast to empathy and perspective taking. This affective mediators might need further 
attention to be explored along with other potential mediators, such as threat, with 
balanced focused on both majority and minority groups. This stance is emphasized by 
Pettigrew and Tropp [2011] stated that not all intergroup contact reduces prejudice. 
Negative contacts, when occur, will instill perceived threats and might resulted in either 
withdrawal from contact or enhance prejudice.  
 
The question then lies on why contact has been prominently glorified when contact itself 
has the potential of negative exposure? In relevance to that, more focused studies on 
intergroup contact that enhances negative emotions deserve explorations in efforts of 
understanding factors that promote and reduce positive effects of contact [Pettigrew, 
2008]. In addition to that, some areas also deserve more emphasize of more focused 
investigation such as potential factors that can help moderate intolerance. It is also worth 
exploring whether developing complex social identity and exposure to diverse beliefs can 
contribute to moderate intolerance, by considering the double-edged of impact on either 
produce positive contact and develop empathy or promote negative contact and 
intensifies uncertainties. 
 
From the Terror Management Theory perspectives, studies reviewed mortality salience 
in several areas, such as the correlation of on mortality salience and self-uncertainty 
(Hohman & Hogg, 2015), religiosity and hostility (Zavala, Cichocka, Orehek & Abdollahi, 
2012), and also on political orientation and moral judgments (Bassett, Van Tongeren, 
Green, Sonntag, & Kilpatrick, 2015). Studies focused in exploring belief superiority also 
highlighted how belief superiority correlates with political issues (Toner, Leary, Asher & 
Jongman-Sereno, 2017) and religious solidarity (Polat, 2018), as an ubiquity that is also 
manifested as moral superiority (Tappin & McKay, 2016) claimed through admission of 
remorse (Forchtner, 2014). Some other studies also emphasized the unfalsifiability notion 
(Friesen, Campbell & Kay, 2016) when strengthened by collective identity (Karpov, 
Lisovskaya & Barry, 2012).  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Why people display intolerance is a question that scientists have struggled to answers. 
This article hypothesized that to be able to understand the manifestation of religious 
intolerance in both individual and group level, it is essential to root back to the 
fundamental underlying factors such as personal uncertainty. When uncertainty needs 
closure, people explore firmness and authority that could offer order and predictability, 
which usually provided by extreme ideologies, beliefs or religions. At this point, existing 
studies develop assumption of how these choices of ideologies and religions transform 
and develop into belief superiority. 
 
Further research can benefit from investigating how belief superiority is developed 
through the lenses of how belief is perceived and understood. A longitudinal study would 
suffice to be employed in effort to gain thorough understanding on the formative stages 
of belief superiority development. As Indonesia is currently going through rising 
intolerance, studies that focused on how diverse beliefs and exposure to different groups 
helps with the development of complex social identity that might contribute to openness, 
reduce prejudice and intolerance. Policies on education and peacebuilding effort can be 
drawn from studies conducted to understand how individuals learn adopt tolerance when 
exposed to dissimilar others. 
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